Using implied volatility surfaces provided by the Optionmetrics database for the period 2003-2007, this study documents the strong, positive relation between investor perceptions of firm uncertainty and financial analysts' activity. Granger causality tests reveal that an increase in perceived uncertainty leads to a subsequent increase in financial analysts' activity, but this increase in activity does not seem to lead to lower firm uncertainty perceptions. The results from a sample of merger and acquisition transactions completed by S&P500 firms confirm a positive relation between firm uncertainty perceptions and financial analysts' subsequent activity. JEL classification: G14
Introduction
Financial markets undergo strong uncertainty variations; for example, the standard deviation of the S&P500 return index during 1980-2008 displays three peaks (see Figure 1) : the 1987 market crash, the Internet bubble, and the recent financial crisis. During these episodes, the standard deviation reached (and even exceeded) 20% annually, almost twice its historical average during that period (11.7%). Investors inevitably face such uncertainty jumps. But do they react? In particular, does financial analysts' activity indicate a response, and if so, how do financial analysts' actions affect investors' perceptions of future uncertainty? We address these questions herein.
To analyze the interaction between financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty, we begin by considering the role of information in capital markets. Uncertainty about future events is the root of risk, from an investor perspective. Merton (1987) studies the relation between incomplete information and the cost of capital, and Easley and O'Hara (2004) use the probability of informed-based trading as a proxy of firm informational context to highlight how information contributes to lower costs of capital. Doukas et al. (2008) show that when an abnormally high number of financial analysts follow a particular firm, it displays a higher valuation ratio. In the same vein, Cheng and Subramanyam (2008) specify that more intense firm activity tracking by financial analysts improves the firm's rating. From the opposite side, Chang et al. (2006) show that firms largely ignored by financial analysts issue new shares less frequently. Moreover, perceived uncertainty appears to condition investors' willingness to participate in financial markets (Bowen et al., 2008 ). Yet the effect of financial analysts' activity on investor uncertainty perceptions is more complicated, in at least some realms. First, we must capture investors' ex-ante perceptions of uncertainty, not its ex-post realization. Second, the question actually is twofold: Does uncertainty attract (or repeal) financial analysts, and does their activity really affect perceptions of uncertainty by investors?
When we clarify the question this way, we realize that prior academic literature provides some conflicting evidence. Many empirical studies offer indirect evidence that financial analysts reduce information asymmetry between firms and their investors, mostly based on a positive correlation between financial analysts' activity and firm characteristics that reportedly are associated with more information asymmetry. Lang and Lundholm (1996) reveal that high growth firms attract more follow-up by financial analysts, and the same holds true for firms with more intangible assets (Barth et al. (2001) ) and high-technology firms (with higher research and development expenses; Barron et al. (2002) ; Kimbrough (2007) ). Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006) provide consistent evidence derived from Australian data about intangible assets.
In contrast, Li et al. (2009) hold that inexperienced financial analysts look for more transparent firms to build a reputation, and Irvine (2001) argues that the behavior of financial analysts is driven by their fees and commissions. O'Brien et al. (2005) show that financial analysts affiliated with institutions in charge of firms' equity offerings are more active, though this association does not mean necessarily that their recommendations are systematically biased.
1 Firms may actively seek to attract financial analysts, such as by organizing press conferences (Francis and Soffer (1997) ) or telephone contacts (Bowen et al. (2002) ). 2 Other factors could alter activity outputs as well, such as constraints due to the work organization. Gilson et al. (2001) stress that financial institutions rarely allocate an analysts' follow-up activities to more than one firm. Duru and Reeb (2002) also point out that a domestic market focus and industry specialization makes it more difficult for financial analysts to follow large and internationally diversified firms. Internationalization brings about its own set of problems, including less frequent contacts with foreign firm managers (Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001)) and difficulties interpreting various accounting methods (Bae et al. (2008) ). Behn and Choi (2008) suggest the reputation of the firm auditor ultimately determines financial analysts' follow-up decisions.
Thus, though previous contributions provide various insights into financial analysts' activity, no clear picture emerges regarding the interaction between financial analysts' activity and investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty. Many factors probably affect financial analysts' day-to-day activity and firm perceived uncertainty simultaneously. The resulting net contribution to investors' information is therefore an empirical matter.
We consider the Optionmetrics database as a unique means to undertake a direct empirical investigation of the relationship between investors' perceptions of uncertainty and financial analysts' activity. Optionmetrics provides volatility surfaces for all U.S. exchange-listed equities, including U.S.
listed indices, with their corresponding measures of implied volatility. Bargeron et al. (2009) use this measure of implied volatility to study the effect of mergers and acquisitions on bidders' uncertainty;
we similarly adopt this method to study the interaction between financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty. The main strength of this empirical approach is that the use of implied volatility reveals investors' ex-ante perception of uncertainty; it is not an ex-post measure of realized volatility. However, it relies on the model chosen to extract the implied volatility from the observed option prices (Optionmetrics mentions the use of "American or European models where 1 Ertimur et al. (2007) argue that the new Securities and Exchange Commission Fair Disclosure regulation reinforced the integrity of financial analysts' recommendations, and Jacob et al. (2008) claim forecasts by investment banks' financial analysts are more accurate. 2 The Fair Disclosure regulation seems to have mitigated this issue (Chen and Matsumoto (2006) ; Ke et al. (2008) ).
appropriate"
3 ), such that it may be influenced by the chosen model's shortcomings. If we suspect these biases correlate significantly with financial analysts' activity determinants, the shortcomings essentially represent a source of noise (measurement errors) in cross-sectional studies.
Therefore, using the implied volatility measure provided by Optionmetrics and information from I/B/E/S, we investigate whether there is a positive or negative correlation between the level of firm perceived uncertainty and financial analysts' activity, as well as whether there is a causal link in the relationship between firm perceived uncertainty and financial analysts' activity. Our sample includes 521 U.S. listed firms that belonged to the S&P500 Index at some point during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] (i.e., S&P500 firms). We focus on these S&P500 firms because we need sufficient listed options for each firm to find the implied volatility measure in Optionmetrics. Furthermore, the S&P500 firms systematically attract the attention of financial analysts, which is an important requirement for this quasi-experiment) . By studying the associated response that constitutes financial analysts' activity, we implement a differences-indifferences (DD) test of the causal relation between firm uncertainty and financial analysts' activity.
We find a clear relation between the level of firm perceived uncertainty and financial analysts' activity. In Figure 2 , we present, by size decile, the average number of financial analysts who issue earnings per share (EPS) forecast revisions for a given firm and the associated average level of firm abnormal implied volatility. A clear and striking pattern emerges: High perceptions of firm 3 All option calculations use historical LIBOR/Eurodollar rates for interest rate inputs and correctly incorporate discrete dividend payments (see www.optionsmetrics.com/ivydbus.html).
uncertainty (i.e., high implied volatility) coincide with low financial analysts' activity, and vice versa.
Firm perceived uncertainty and financial analysts' activity also interact with firm size, such that small firms present higher levels of perceived uncertainty and initiate far less financial analyst activity (and again, vice versa). We investigate whether this apparent negative correlation between firm perceived uncertainty and financial analysts' activity correctly depicts the dynamic between these variables and provides insights into their causal relations. The Granger causality test offers unambiguous evidence.
Whether we use the number of financial analysts issuing EPS forecasts revisions or the number of EPS forecast revisions to proxy for the intensity of financial analysts' activity, we find that prior variations:
• in firm perceived uncertainty are positively associated with current variations in financial analysts activity (i.e., investors' increasing perceptions of firm uncertainty attract more financial analysts' activity).
• in financial activity are not significantly associated with current variations of firm perceived uncertainty (i.e., financial analysts' increasing activity does not lead to a decrease in investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty).
The Granger causality thus reveals a positive dynamic relation, from firm uncertainty perceptions to financial analysts' activity. But this one-way relation suggests financial analysts' activity does not contribute significantly to uncertainty resolution.
To confirm these Granger causality test results, we use a sample of M&A transactions undertaken by S&P500 firms. The results unambiguously confirm that M&A transactions increase acquirer implied volatility, which is our measure of investors' uncertainty perceptions (see also Bargeron et al. (2009) database. We obtain financial analysts' information (i.e., number of analysts issuing revisions by firms, number of EPS forecasts issued by firms) from the I/B/E/S database. Implied volatility measures come from the Optionmetrics database. Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics for our sample, including the number of firms by year, the aggregate market value of our sample at the end of each year (million USD), the percentage of aggregate U.S. stock market capitalization 4 that our sample represents, and the ratios of the average S&P500 firm size to the average U.S. listed firm size and of the median S&P500 firm size to the median U.S. listed firm size. The S&P500 firms account for more than half of the U.S. stock market capitalization each year; our S&P500 firms sample is economically significant. Furthermore, the S&P500 firms clearly tend to be large, and a few very large firms drive these reports.
Variables

Firm uncertainty
We use firm abnormal implied volatility as a proxy of firm perceived uncertainty. We obtain the firm implied volatility from Optionmetrics, which reports on a per firm basis the daily volatility surfaces and associated implied volatility measures. We follow Bargeron et al. (2009) so we use monthly variations of ‫ܸܫܣ‬ , (first differences of ‫ܸܫ‬ ,௧ ):
We obtain the monthly variations of abnormal implied volatility, ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆‬ ,௧ , by regressing the firm monthly variation of implied volatility, ‫ܸܫܣ∆‬ , , on the concomitant monthly variation of market implied volatility ‫ܸܫܯ∆(‬ ,), using the OEX index 7 (i.e., the S&P 100 Option Index) as a market proxy. The monthly variations of abnormal implied volatility, ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆‬ , , are estimated residuals of the following regression:
In turn, ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆‬ , is our main proxy for firm perceived uncertainty. In Section 4, we test the robustness of our results to variations of this definition.
Financial analysts' activity
We use two measures of the importance of financial analysts' activity for a given firm: the number of financial analysts issuing one-or two-year EPS forecast revisions for the focal firm during the month of interest ‫ܣܨ#(‬ , ) and the number of one-or two-year EPS forecast revisions issued by these same financial analysts during the same period ‫ܴܱܨ#(‬ , ).
In Table 1 , we report the ratio of the number of financial analysts issuing forecast revisions on the S&P500 firms to the number of financial analysts' EPS forecast revisions present in the I/B/E/S database by year. The S&P500 firms draw approximately half of financial analysts' activity, though this proportion decreases slightly during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Our S&P500 firm sample therefore represents a significant fraction of financial analysts' industry activity during the analyzed period.
With Table 2 we present descriptive statistics about the financial analysts' activity and firm uncertainty by size deciles. For each firm, we compute its average market value and thereby assign firms to corresponding size deciles. By the tenth decile, the average firm size gets driven up by a few very large firms, and according to the data in Table 2 , financial analysts' activity clearly correlates with firm size (Bhushan, 1989) . The smallest S&P500 firms attract an average of 3.53 financial analysts (who issue forecast revisions on the firms' EPS), but the largest ones attract an average of 9.69 analysts. According to the fifth column in Table 2 , investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty also correlate with firm size. In particular, the average ‫ܸܫ‬ ,௧ is significantly higher for small firms, and firms in the first (smallest) decile display an average implied volatility almost 50% higher than firms included in the tenth (largest) decile. We build Figure 2 using the statistics in Table 2 . The negative correlation between the level of financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty is striking:
The smallest S&P500 firms display the highest implied volatility values and are followed by the fewest financial analysts (and vice versa). The univariate correlation coefficient between the number of financial analysts issuing EPS forecast revisions and the average implied volatility in the corresponding size decile is -.87. Does this negative correlation accurately depict the dynamic between these variables and provide insights about their causal relations?
The Granger causality test
Financial analysts' activity displays a strong seasonal pattern (Ivkovi and Jegadeesh (2004) ), so we remove the seasonal pattern in ‫ܣܨ#‬ , and ‫ܴܱܨ#‬ , . For each firm included in our sample, we remove, from the observed values of ‫ܣܨ#‬ , (or ‫ܴܱܨ#‬ , ), the average value of ‫ܣܨ#‬ , (or ‫ܴܱܨ#‬ , ) for firm ݅ in month ݉. We then conduct our analyses on the seasonally adjusted values of ‫ܣܨ#‬ , and ‫ܴܱܨ#‬ , . We follow a similar procedure to remove potential seasonal patterns in the average abnormal implied volatility variations ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆(‬ , ). In Section 4, we describe our tests of the robustness of our results to this adjustment procedure.
Using this measure of seasonally adjusted financial analysts' activity, we investigate the statistical relation between financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty, with the framework introduced by Granger (1969) , who states that a variable ‫ݔ‬ causes (or Granger causes) a variable ‫ݕ‬ if the forecasts of ‫ݕ‬ improve when the lagged values of ‫ݔ‬ appear in the information set available to predict ‫.ݕ‬ To test for the presence of Granger causality, we adopt the following bivariate autoregressive specification:
‫ܣܨ#‬ ,ିଷ ‫ݑ‬ , , and (4.1)
where ݅ refers to firm ݅ , and ݉ indicates month ݉. 
‫ܣܨ#‬ ,ିଷ ‫ݑ‬ , , and (5.1)
We also follow Hamilton (1996) and implement a formal Granger causality test for each firm.
For a given firm ݅, the three-step procedure is (using the example of Equation 4.1):
(i) Estimate by ordinary least squares the full model:
and compute the corresponding residual sum of squares (ܴܵܵ ଵ, ).
(ii) Estimate by ordinary least squares the restricted model:
and compute the corresponding the residual sum of squares (ܴܵܵ , ).
(iii) Compute the ܵ statistic:
where ‫‬ is the lag length (3 in the current specification), and ܰ is the number of observations for firm ݅.
The ܵ statistic follows ‫,‪ሺ‬ܨ‬ ܰ െ ‫2‬ െ 1ሻ.
Following firm-by-firm Granger causality tests, we can test two different null hypotheses: 
where ܰ is the number of firms in the sample. Hurlin (2005) shows that ‫ܧ‬ሺܹ ு ሻ ؆ ‫‬ ቀ ே ିଶିଵ ே ିଶିଷ ቁ and
follows asymptotically a ܰሺ0,1ሻ.
We next build the ‫ܥܵ‬ test by summing, for each firm, the estimated regression coefficients of the lagged variables (for the case of Equation 4.1):
We then standardize the sum of the firm-by-firm estimated coefficients by their corresponding standard deviation, using an ordinary least squares variance-covariance estimator:
Finally, we compute the ‫ܥܵ‬ test as the average of the firm-by-firm standardized sum of coefficients:
The ‫ܥܵ‬ statistic asymptotically follows a ܰሺ0,1ሻ under the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is equal to 0.
Results
We report the tests of Granger causality between financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty in Tables 3-5. Tables 3 and 5 use the number of financial analysts ‫ܣܨ#(‬ , )
issuing EPS forecast revisions as a measure of financial analysts' activity, whereas in Table 4 , the number of one-and two-year EPS forecast revisions ‫ܴܱܨ#(‬ , ) issued by these financial analysts is the measure. In all three tables, our proxy for firm perceived uncertainty is the variation of the monthly average abnormal implied volatility ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆(‬ , ). Tables 3 and 4 exclude contemporaneous effects in the model specification (Equations 4.1 and 4.2), whereas Because the ‫ܪ‬ Granger causality tests across all panels are highly significant, we can clearly reject the null hypothesis of the simultaneous absence of Granger causality between financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty for all firms in the sample (strong rejection of Granger causality). The ‫ܥܵ‬ statistic indicates the average significance and sign of these Granger relations: Tables 3 and 4 show that an increase in the average abnormal volatility leads to an increase in financial analysts' activity, whether we proxy for it by the number of financial analysts issuing EPS forecast revisions ‫ܣܨ#(‬ , ) or by the number of EPS forecast revisions ‫ܴܱܨ#(‬ , ). This result also is robust to the inclusion of contemporaneous effects in the model specification (Table 5) .
Furthermore, the results in Tables 3 and 4 , Panels B, suggest a positive and significant ‫ܥܵ‬ test that implies that an increase in financial analysts' activity actually increases average abnormal volatility.
However, when we control for the contemporaneous correlation between financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty in Table 5 (Panel B), the ‫ܥܵ‬ test loses its statistical significance. That is, the results in Tables 3 and 4 are driven by contemporaneous correlation (combined with average abnormal implied volatility shock persistence).
We therefore can conclude that an increase in past firm perceived uncertainty leads to an increase in current financial analysts' activity. Financial analysts react to increased firm uncertainty perceptions by issuing more EPS forecast revisions. However, this increase in financial analysts' activity does not really help lower future firm uncertainty perceptions. We note the contemporaneous correlation between ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆‬ , and ‫ܣܨ#‬ , in Table 5 Because the Granger causality test is a statistical test of causality, our results essentially indicate that variations in firm uncertainty can predict future financial analysts' activity. Beyond the limits inherent to the statistical assumptions on which the Granger causality test rely, our results might capture some statistical relations derived from latent factors that induce both firm perceived uncertainty and financial analysts' activity. Motivations for such behaviors appear in prior literature, ranging from reputation building (Li et al. (2009) ) to information cost processing (Gilson et al. (2001) ; Duru and Reeb (2002) ). Only an assessment of financial analysts' activity in response to exogenous shocks in firm uncertainty can enable us to determine if the data support causal relation between firm perceived uncertainty variations and financial analysts' activity. In Section 3, we therefore use M&As to investigate this issue.
Financial Analysts' Activity and Firm Uncertainty Around Mergers and Acquisitions
After we present our data source and summary statistics about M&A transactions completed by the sample S&P500 firms during 2003-2007, we introduce the differences-in-differences approach and report our results.
Data
We collect, from the Thomson-Reuters SDC database, M&A transactions completed by the 521 firms in our S&P500 firm sample (see Section 2.1), using the following criteria: Our 521 firms undertook and completed 1,472 M&A transactions during this period, as we list in Table 6 by firm size decile. We form these deciles using the average firm market value during the study period, and we report the aggregate number of M&A deals completed by firms in each decile, the average and median M&A deal size, average relative deal size (i.e., ratio of deal size to firm size), completed by large firm are also larger (USD2,256 million average, USD828 million median) than transactions completed by small firms (USD230 million average, USD165 million median). The average relative M&A deal size ratio decreases with firm size deciles (13% for small firms to 2% for large firms), highlighting that firm size grows faster than deal size. These known facts have been well documented in prior academic literature. In addition, the percentage of public targets appears to increase with firm size, but we observe the reverse behavior for the percentage of private targets.
Again, this result is not surprising, because private targets are smaller firms on average (Fuller et al. (2002) ; Table 1 ), and smaller acquirers (decile 1) engage in smaller acquisitions (nearly ten times smaller average deal size).
For our multivariate analyses, we restrict the sample to the 346 significant transactions for which the deal size represents at least 5% of the acquirer market value. We impose this last restriction to ensure that we focus on transactions large enough to generate an exogenous shock on the acquirer firms' uncertainty.
3.2. The differences-in-differences estimation
The differences-in-differences (DD) estimation technique has been applied widely in finance and economics; as Bertrand et al. (2004, p. 1) state, "DD consists of identifying a specific intervention or treatment. One compares the difference in outcome after and before the intervention for groups affected by it to this difference for unaffected groups." We consider the decision to undertake an M&A as the treatment, such that the outcomes are the abnormal implied volatility (to check whether M&A decisions increase investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty; see Bargeron et al. (2009) ) and the financial analysts' activity (to study their response to the exogenous shock on firm uncertainty).
More formally, our DD estimation approach takes the following form:
where ݅ is the firm index; ‫ݐ‬ is the period index; ܻ ,௧ is the outcome variable (either ‫ܣܨ#‬ ,௧ or ‫ܴܱܨ#‬ ,௧
for financial analysts' activity and ‫ܸܫܣ‬ ,௧ for firm perceived uncertainty) for firm ݅ during period ‫;ݐ‬ ܿ and ܿ ௧ are firm-and period-fixed effects, respectively; ܺ ,௧ is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the after-treatment period (after M&A completion) and 0 otherwise; and ܶ ,௧ is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm ݅ has completed a M&A (treatment) and 0 otherwise. The interaction ܶ ,௧ ൈ ܺ ,௧ thus identifies the after-treatment period for firms that have completed an M&A.
For a given M&A transaction, assuming only one M&A transaction is available in our sample for the given month and that information is available for all 521 firms in the sample for that month, we collect 521 observations in two periods: before and after the official M&A announcement date.
Before that date, for a firm ݅ that completes the deal, ܶ ,௧ equals 1, and for the 520 remaining firms, ܶ ,௧ equals to 0, but for all 521 firms, ܺ ,௧ is 0. In contrast, after the official announcement, for the firm ݅ that completed the deal, ܶ ,௧ equals 1, and for the 520 remaining firms, ܶ ,௧ equals 0. For these 521 firms, ܺ ,௧ is 1. We find that the 521 S&P500 firms completed 346 M&A transactions during (ii) For a given month, we generate by random drawing in the placebo subsample the placebo transactions. For each placebo transaction, we assign a value 1 to T ୧,୲ . The remaining firms in the placebo subsample are assigned the value 0 for ܶ ,௧ ;.
(iii) We replicate this procedure for each month of the study period, which provides the bootstrap sample. We replicate the full procedure 1000 times.
(iv) For each of the 1,000 bootstrap samples, we estimate Equation 13 by ordinary least squares and collect the estimated placebo coefficients and corresponding t-statistics.
(v)
We build the empirical distribution of the estimated placebo t-statistics and use it to obtain randomized p-values for the coefficients of interest.
Results
In The results in Panel B of Table 7 offer an unambiguous answer: They increase their forecast revisions. Both the number of financial analysts issuing EPS forecast revisions and the total number EPS forecast revisions issued increase significantly in the period after the M&A announcement. The increase in the former measure averages .342 (p = .01). Thus, financial analysts respond to an increase in firm perceived uncertainty by increasing their activity. This result confirms the results from our Granger causality tests. The notorious difficulty of predicting M&A decision strengthens this interpretation: The M&A transaction-generated shock on firm perceived uncertainty is not subject to anticipation by financial analysts.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we study the robustness of our results even when we vary the econometric specifications and variable definitions. We start by testing whether we obtain comparable results with different autoregressive specifications. We then replicate the Granger causality test for the variation of the average abnormal implied volatility ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆(‬ , ) and the number of financial ‫ܣܨ#(‬ , ) using the average unadjusted implied volatility and median abnormal implied volatility. We finally investigate whether our results are sensitive to the chosen seasonal adjustment procedure.
Granger causality test with AR(1) and AR(6) specifications
Hamilton (1994) stresses that the results of the empirical test of Granger causality can be surprisingly sensitive to the choice of the lag length of the autoregressive specification. We therefore consider whether the results in Table 3 
For the AR(6) specification, these equations become:
With Table 8 , we confirm that using an AR(1) specification provides results consistent with the AR(3) specification in Table 3 . In Table 9 , we focus on the AR(6) specification. The Panel A results are consistent with the parallel findings in Table 3 , namely, an increase in average abnormal implied volatility ‫)ܸܫܣܣ∆(‬ leads to an increase in financial analysts' activity ‫.)ܣܨ#(‬ However, the findings in
Panel B indicate that when we adopt an AR(6) specification, the ‫ܥܵ‬ test loses significance (.0003, p = .47). Therefore, financial analysts' activity no longer affects future firm uncertainty significantly. This result reinforces the evidence from Table 5 , which showed that introducing contemporaneous effects in the Granger causality test specification leads to the loss of significance for the ‫ܥܵ‬ test.
Average unadjusted implied volatility and median abnormal implied volatility
The abnormal implied volatility ‫ܸܫܣ(‬ ,௧ ) comes from a regression of firm implied volatility on the concomitant daily average implied volatility of the market, obtained using the OEX index. We test whether our results are robust to the chosen adjustment procedure by replicating the Table 3 results in Table 10 with the variation of the average unadjusted daily implied volatility as a proxy for firm perceived uncertainty. The average daily unadjusted implied volatility is:
where ݅ is the firm index, ݉ indicates month ݉ , and #݉ refers to the number of trading days in the month. The corresponding monthly variation is:
In Table 10 , Panels A and B, we thus confirm the robustness of the Table 3 results to the chosen regression procedure for computing abnormal implied volatility.
In Section 2.2, we also chose to obtain the monthly abnormal implied volatility measure by taking the arithmetic average of the daily abnormal implied volatility estimates (see Equation 2 ). The arithmetic average may be affected by presence of outliers, and such outliers could be present in the monthly implied volatility measure at the firm level. 9 Therefore, we replicate these results using the variation of the median abnormal implied volatility, such that Equations 1-3 become, respectively:
, and (14)
In Table 11 , Panels A and B, we confirm that our results are not driven by the presence of outliers.
Granger causality test with seasonal adjustment
Because financial analysts' activity displays a known seasonal pattern (Ivkovi and Jegadeesh (2004) ), we removed this effect in Section 2.3 by eliminating the observed values of ‫ܣܨ#‬ , (or ‫ܴܱܨ#‬ , ) and the average value of ‫ܣܨ#‬ , for firm ݅ in month ݉). In this section, we test whether our results depend on the chosen seasonal adjustment procedure. As we report in Table 12 , the results we obtain using the same specification but working with seasonally unadjusted variables are consistent with those results in Table 3 .
Conclusion
With this research, we study the dynamic relation between financial analysts' activity and investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty. Specifically, we investigate whether increases in firm perceived uncertainty lead to increases in financial analyst activity, as well as whether financial analysts' activity influence future investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty. We use, as a proxy of firm perceived uncertainty, option-based implicit volatility measures provided by the Optionmetrics database. Our proxies of financial analysts' activity rely on EPS forecast revisions, which appear in the I/B/E/S database. We track a sample of 521 firms that belonged to the S&P500 index during the period from 2003 to 2007.
The Granger causality tests deliver unambiguous results: An increase in firm perceived uncertainty leads to an increase in financial analysts' activity, but this increase in activity does not contribute significantly to reducing investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty. We also confirm the statistically significant positive relation from firm perceived uncertainty to financial analysts' activity using a sample of 327 M&A transactions undertaken by our 521 S&P500 firms as a quasi-experiment.
To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first to provide a direct empirical test of the relation between financial analysts' activity and investors' perceptions of firm uncertainty. The
Granger causality approach does not allow us to pinpoint the channels through which the causal interactions flow though. Even if our results indicate that the increase in financial analysts' activity does not decrease firm uncertainty, as perceived by investors, they cannot suggest that financial analysts offer no contribution at all. Rather, on average, the limits and/or biases that affect their activity are constraining enough to prevent the detection of any beneficial impact. Another issue that we do not address is the nature of potential financial analysts' contributions. Are they collecting new information and broadcasting it to investors, or do they limit themselves to broadcasting existing, unnoticed information? This question persists, though empirical evidence provided by Altinkilic et al.
(2010) seems consistent with the latter view. Average Number of Analysts Average Abnormal Implied Volatility Size Deciles Table 1 Sample description.
Column 1 reports the number of firms by year, Column 2 contains the aggregate market value of our sample at the end of each year (million USD), and Column 3 is the percentage of aggregate U.S. stock market capitalization that the sample represents. Columns 4 and 5 provide the ratios of the average S&P500 firm size to the average U.S. listed firm size and of the median S&P500 firm size to the median U.S. listed firm size, respectively. Column 6 reports the ratio of the number of financial analysts issuing EPS forecast revisions about S&P500 firms to the number issuing EPS forecast revisions in the whole I/B/E/S database for a given year. Table 2 Financial analysts' activity and firm perceived uncertainty Column 1 reports the average market value of firms in each decile (million USD), and Column 2 provides the corresponding median value (Million USD). ‫ܣܨ#‬ തതതതതത is the average number of financial analysts issuing one-or twoyear EPS forecast revisions for firms in each decile, and ‫ܴܱܨ#‬ തതതതതതതത is the corresponding average number of EPS forecast revisions. ‫ܸܫ‬ തതത is the average monthly implied volatility for firms included in each decile.
Size Decile Table 3 Granger causality test: Number of financial analysts versus abnormal Implied volatility.
The number of financial analysts issuing EPS forecasts revisions ‫ܣܨ#(‬ , ) is a measure of financial analysts' activity, and the variation of the firm monthly average abnormal implied volatility ‫ܸܫܣܣ∆(‬ , ) is the proxy for firm perceived uncertainty. Variables are defined in Section 2.2. Table 8 Granger causality test with AR(1) specification. Table 9 Granger causality test with AR(6) specification. Table 10 Granger causality test: Average implied volatility. Table 11 Granger causality test: Median abnormal implied volatility. 
